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Abstract
A two-level adaptive control scheme against power system voltage instability is proposed, to deal with emergency conditions by
acting on distribution transformers and/or by curtailing some loads. The lower level includes distributed controllers, each acting
once the voltage at a monitored transmission bus settles below a threshold value. The upper level benefits from wide-area monitoring
and adjusts in real-time the voltage thresholds of the local controllers. Emergency detection is based on the sign of sensitivities.
The proposed scheme is robust with respect to communication failures. Its performance is illustrated through detailed simulations
of a small but realistic 74-bus test system.
Keywords: Power systems, voltage instability, emergency control, distributed control, wide-area monitoring, adaptive systems,
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1. Introduction
Voltage instability of power systems is linked to the inabil-
ity of the combined generation-transmission system to provide
the power requested by loads [1]. In a typical voltage insta-
bility scenario, the maximum power deliverable to loads drops
under the effects of a large disturbance and the limitations on
reactive power generation; concurrently, the loads connected to
the transmission system tend to restore their powers near the
value before the disturbance. Those antagonistic effects pre-
vent the system from regaining a state of operating equilibrium
with network voltages in acceptable ranges of values [2]. De-
pending on the involved component dynamics and the severity
of the disturbance, voltage instability can evolve in time frames
of several seconds (short-term instability) or tens of seconds
up to several minutes (long-term instability). In this paper, the
emphasis is on long-term voltage instability, in which network
voltages undergo a generally monotonic decrease after the ini-
tiating disturbance.
A typical example from simulation is shown in Fig. 1 (ob-
tained with the system considered in the results section). The
power system is subject to a short-circuit which is cleared by
opening a transmission line. The plot shows the evolution of
the voltage magnitudes at a transmission and the closest dis-
tribution bus1. After the fault is cleared, the system is subject
to electromechanical oscillations (of the rotors of synchronous
generators) before approaching a short-term equilibrium. Next,
the system evolves in the long term under the above mentioned
effect of generator reactive power limitation and load power
restoration.
1all voltages are shown in per unit (pu), i.e. divided by the nominal voltage
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Figure 1: Example of long-term voltage instability
When pronounced, and if not controlled, voltage instability
may result in voltage collapse. In the case of Fig. 1 this takes
on the form of a loss of synchronism of a nearby generator,
leading to the sharp final voltage drop. In practice, this will
trigger a sequence of events leading most likely to a blackout.
The heavy consequences of power system blackouts in terms of
economical and societal costs [3, 4] motivate the improvement
of control schemes to deal with voltage instability problems.
Remedies against voltage instability can be categorized into
preventive actions and corrective controls.
Preventive actions consists of adjusting the operating point
in order the system to be able to face each credible incident
(referred to as contingency) of a predefined list. Those ac-
tions are taken in normal operating state, i.e. before the oc-
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currence of any disturbance, and involve costs to protect the
system against hypothetical events. However, many voltage
incidents resulted from a severe low-probability disturbance,
against which it would be too expensive - if at all feasible -
to take preventive actions.
Corrective controls aim at acting after the actual occurrence
of a disturbance. They can be broadly classified into open-loop
and closed-loop. Open-loop control resorts to actions deter-
mined off-line from exhaustive simulations of postulated sce-
narios while closed-loop control assesses the disturbance sever-
ity through measurements, adjusts its actions correspondingly,
tracks the system evolution and repeats some actions if the pre-
vious ones are not sufficient.
The dominant trend is to integrate emergency controls in Sys-
tem Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) [5] while exploiting
new technological solutions such as synchronized phasor mea-
surements [6] and fast communications as the main enablers
of power system Wide Area Monitoring System (WAMS) [7].
New algorithms are needed to process the data collected in
WAMS and effectively control unstable system evolutions.
This paper deals with such an algorithm. It proposes an adap-
tive two-level emergency control scheme aimed at driving the
voltage unstable system towards a new, acceptable equilibrium
[1]. The lower level consists of distributed controllers acting in
closed-loop on loads once the voltages at monitored transmis-
sion buses fall (and stay for some time) below threshold values.
The upper level takes advantage of a WAMS to detect instabil-
ity, and assign their voltage thresholds to the lower-level con-
trollers, in the spirit of an adaptive system. The control scheme
is robust with respect to controller or telecommunication fail-
ures.
The paper is organized as follows. To make the paper self-
supporting, some fundamentals of voltage instability and its
countermeasures are recalled in Section 2. The lower and upper
levels of the proposed scheme are detailed in Section 3 and 4,
respectively. Section 5 is devoted to simulation results, while
conclusions are provided in Section 6.
2. Voltage instability mechanism and corrective controls
This section reviews the basic voltage instability mechanism
of a power system subject to a large disturbance [1]. It uses a
two-bus system example made as simple as possible while still
capturing the main features of instability. Next, the two correc-
tive controls considered in this work are briefly described.
2.1. Voltage instability mechanism
Consider the system in Fig. 2.a in which a generator feeds
a load through a transmission line. It is assumed that the gen-
erator keeps its terminal voltage Vg constant and provides any
active power requested by the load. The line is simply repre-
sented by its series reactance X. Finally, the load is assumed
to have unity power factor, i.e. it does not consume reactive




































Figure 3: Network PV curve (load with unity power factor)
where all symbols are defined in Fig. 2.b. Combining these two










The variation of V with P is shown in Fig. 3 where the up-
per (resp. lower) part of the curve corresponds to the solution
with the + (resp. the −) sign in (2). Such a plot is referred to
as “PV curve” by power system engineers. The load power is
maximum at point C, also called “critical” point. The maximum
deliverable power is PC =
V2g
2X




Load dynamics play an important role in voltage instability.
In the long-term time frame, loads are controlled by Load Tap
Changers (LTCs). These devices adjust the turn ratios of the
transformers feeding distribution systems in order to keep the
voltages at the distribution sides of the transformers close to a
set-point. LTCs can act in discrete steps only, corresponding to
the available transformer tap positions. They remain the main
voltage control means in distribution systems, although this task
is expected to be shared by distributed generation units in future
smart grid architectures [8, 9].
To illustrate the LTC effect, in Fig. 2.c, the load of our two-
bus system has been replaced by a load at distribution level be-
hind a step-down transformer. In line with the previous simpli-

















Figure 4: Voltage instability explained with (network and load) PV curves
where r is the transformer ratio and V2 the distribution voltage.
Furthermore, a constant conductance load is considered:





Let Vo2 be the voltage set-point of the LTC. Whenever V2 falls
below Vo2 − ϵ (resp. raises above Vo2 + ϵ), the LTC decreases
(resp. increases) r in order to bring back V2 in the dead-band
[Vo2 − ϵ Vo2 + ϵ]. r is changed step by step with delays between
changes. The dead-band is needed for proper operation with a
limited number of tap positions.
Network and load characteristics are combined in Fig. 4. As-
sume that the system operates initially at point O. The dotted
line passing through O is the transient load characteristic, cor-
responding to (4), while the vertical dashed line is the steady-
state load characteristic. In steady state, assuming that the LTC
has restored V2 = Vo2 (neglecting the effect of ϵ), the load power




. Thus, by controlling distribution voltages,
LTCs make loads appear constant power in steady state.
The remaining of the figure illustrates a typical instability
scenario. A severe disturbance, such as the outage of a trans-
mission equipment, increases X so much that the new maxi-
mum deliverable power (corresponding to point C) falls below
Po, the power initially consumed by the load, that the LTC will
try to restore indirectly. Since the long-term load characteristic
does no longer intersect the network PV curve, it can be con-
cluded that the system has lost its equilibrium. This will result
in the following unstable evolution. Right after the disturbance,
the new operating point is A, at the intersection of the short-
term load and network post-disturbance characteristics. At this
point, the load power is smaller than Po, which means that V2 is
smaller than Vo2 . Hence, the LTC will decrease r in successive
steps. As can be seen from (4), each new value of r yields a
new short-term load characteristic. The intersections of those
characteristics with the network PV curve give the successive
operating points shown with dots in Fig. 4: in its unsuccessful
attempt to restore the distribution voltage, the LTC depresses
the transmission voltage V . After crossing the maximum power
point C, the tap changes are even counterproductive!
A similar behaviour is observed in Fig. 1 where the distribu-
tion voltage (dashed line) cannot be restored in the correspond-
ing [0.99 1.01] pu dead-band.
Expectedly, some features of voltage instability are not
shown in the above simplistic example [1, 10]:
• an excessive decline of voltages is unacceptable since it
may cause further equipment (in particular loads) to trip or
it may trigger a faster instability such as loss of synchro-
nism or motor stalling (see the final evolution in Fig. 1);
• generators are not pure voltage sources. In normal condi-
tions, the terminal voltage of a synchronous generator is
tightly controlled by its automatic voltage regulator. How-
ever, if keeping that voltage constant requires producing
too much reactive power, the generator field current may
exceed its thermal limit and be reduced after some delay
by an Over-Excitation Limiter (OEL) to avoid equipment
damages. The resulting loss of voltage control by a gen-
erator has a similar effect as the initiating outage: the PV
curve further shrinks, and the maximum power deliverable
to the load further decreases;
• besides LTCs, there are other load power restoration mech-
anisms such as the control of heating loads by thermostats.
2.2. Corrective controls
The above simple example suggests directly two types of cor-
rective controls, which are considered in this paper:
1. modified LTC control: to stop the degradation caused by
LTCs. Standard emergency actions consist of blocking tap
changers on their current positions, moving them to pre-
determined positions, or reducing the voltage set-points
Vo2 [10–12]. In this paper a more advanced control is con-
sidered which involves a transmission voltage preserving
logic [13];
2. load shedding: moves the long-term load characteristic to
the left, in Fig. 4, so that a new intersection with the net-
work PV curve is created. Curtailing a proper amount of
interruptible load at the proper place and in appropriate
time is a very effective countermeasure against voltage in-
stability [10, 14–18]. It is needed when system voltages
drop too much immediately after the disturbance, the LTCs
being to slow to move. At the price of disconnecting some
loads, the others quickly regain normal voltage. Shedding
is actuated by opening distribution circuit breakers; finer
control of individual appliances is envisioned in the con-
text of demand response management in smart grids [8, 9].
The above corrective controls affect the quality of power sup-
ply, and, hence, are envisaged in severe situations only. Less in-
trusive controls, to be actuated in priority, consist of increasing
generator voltages (though in a limited interval) or connecting
shunt capacitors (if available) to the transmission bus feeding
the load. Both actions increase to some extent the maximum
power deliverable to the load. A more detailed discussion of
emergency voltage stability controls can be found in [19, 20].
3. Lower-level distributed control of load shedding and tap
changers
3.1. Distributed control
The design of an emergency control scheme against voltage
instability must address a number of issues:
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• the magnitude of the corrective action needed to stabilize
the system is not known beforehand;
• saving the system from a blackout is the priority. To this
end, the corrective action can be slightly in excess, in ex-
change for other advantages such as reliability. Never-
theless, since corrective control is intrusive from the con-
sumer viewpoint, it should be as small as possible;
• real-life power systems include a large number of loads
and generators. The regions exposed to voltage instability
are known by transmission system operators. However,
inside those regions, it is not known beforehand where it
is most appropriate to act. This is even more true for well
meshed networks;
• loads are the most effective components to act on. How-
ever, in practice, there is much uncertainty regarding their
behaviour. For instance, when opening a distribution cir-
cuit breaker, the controller does not necessarily know how
much reactive power is going to be curtailed together with
the active power, and how much the power of the remain-
ing loads will vary with the voltage increase;
• the scheme must be robust with respect to failures of sen-
sors or actuators. This requires some form of redundancy.
Most of the above issues are addressed by resorting to a set of
controllers distributed over the region of interest, and operating
in closed-loop. “Closed-loop operation” refers to the ability for
a controller to act in successive steps, each decision relying on
the measured result of previous actions. The distributed design
allows adjusting corrective control to the disturbance location
[21]. It also provides redundancy, since in case of failure of one
controller, the others can take over [22].
Two additional features of the distributed controllers con-
tribute to making the scheme simple and, hence, more reliable:
• the controllers do not exchange information, but are rather
informed of their respective actions through the power sys-
tem itself. This is made possible by the absence of “iner-
tia” in voltage dynamics: in the time frame of concern,
it can be considered that the effects of one controller are
instantaneously felt by the others;
• the controllers do not need any system model.
In the sequel a combination of distributed load shedding and
LTC controllers is considered, as sketched in Fig. 5. Each load
shedding controller monitors the voltage V at a transmission
bus and acts on a set of loads at distribution level, located close
enough to the monitored bus, so that their curtailment allows in-
creasing V . Each LTC controller measures the voltage of both
the transmission and the distribution terminal of the transformer
it is controlling. In normal operating conditions, it regulates the
distribution voltage as usual, while in emergency conditions, it
preserves the transmission voltage. The remaining of this sec-















Figure 5: Distributed control of load shedding and tap changers
STARTED SHEDIDLE and t − t0 < τ
V < V th
V < V th and load can be curtailed
[ set t0 to current t ]
V ≥ V thV ≥ V
th
[ set t0 to current t ]
V ≥ V th or no more load can be curtailed
V < V th and load can be curtailed
and t − t0 ≥ τ




Figure 6: Logic of individual load shedding controller. Within brackets: action
taken when the transition takes place [22]
3.2. Load shedding controller
Each load shedding controller relies on the simple rule:
IF V < V th during time τ , shed load power ∆P (5)
A more precise description is given by Fig. 6 in the form of an
automaton. As long as V remains above V th, the controller is
idle, while it is started as soon as a disturbance causes V to drop
below V th. Let to be the time where this change takes place.
The controller remains started until either the voltage recovers,
or the time τ is elapsed since to. In the latter case, the controller
sheds a power ∆P and returns to either idle (if V recovers above
V th or no more load can be shed) or started state (if V remains
below V th and there remains load to shed). In the second case,
the current time is taken as the new value of to and the controller
is ready to act again.
The choice of V th will be discussed in detail in Section 4. As
regards τ and ∆P, they can be adjusted to the severity of the
situation, assessed through the amplitude of V th − V [22]. In
fact, our analysis of many cases has shown that small τ and ∆P
values, i.e. shedding with little delay and in small steps, usually
lead to shedding less load. It also makes the system recover
more smoothly. Thus, constant, pre-defined values of τ and ∆P
are considered in this paper. Note that τ must be large enough
so that the controller does not to react to a short-circuit on the
transmission system. Indeed, after the fault has been cleared by
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Figure 8: Combined DVR-TVP logic of individual LTC controller. A, B and C
refer to the regions of operation in Fig. 7. A star (*) indicates that to is set to
current time t when the transition takes place. “rmin” (resp. “rmax”) denotes
the minimum (resp. maximum) value of the ratio. For clarity, adjustments of
τ (different delays before first and between subsequent tap changes) are not
shown.
3.3. Load Tap changer controller
With the transformer ratio defined as in Fig. 2.c, a standard
LTC controller monitors the distribution voltage V2 and modi-
fies the ratio r as follows: decrease r if V2 < Vo2 − ϵ, increase
r if V2 > Vo2 + ϵ, and leave it unchanged otherwise. A more
advanced control logic is considered here, in which the trans-
mission voltage V (on the high-voltage side of the transformer)
is also monitored with respect to a threshold value V th. As long
as V remains above V th + δ the LTC operates in the above, stan-
dard manner. On the contrary, if V falls below V th − δ, the
LTC stops regulating the distribution voltage and, instead, pre-
serves the transmission voltage by increasing r. If V lies in the
[V th−δ V th+δ] range, the tap changer does not move; this dead-
band prevents from oscillating between the Distribution Voltage
Regulation (DVR) and the Transmission Voltage Preservation
(TVP) logics. The above rules are summarized in Fig. 7 while
the combined DVR-TVP logic is presented in automaton form
in Fig. 8.
The choice of V th is discussed in detail in Section 4. The
dead-band 2ϵ is unchanged with respect to usual LTCs, with a
typical value in the range of 2 %. The dead-band 2δ can be
given the same value.
3.4. Automatic shunt compensation switching
As already mentioned, this paper focuses on LTC control and
load shedding. However, the switching of shunt compensa-
tion (switching on capacitors - switching off reactors) is han-
dled similarly, and can be described in similar terms. Usu-
ally, several capacitor banks are available in a substation. Once
the transmission voltage V falls below V th, the local controller
switches one bank at a time, after a delay similar to τ in Fig. 6.
4. Upper level: emergency detection and voltage threshold
adjustment
4.1. Motivation for an upper level
In spite of their advantages, the distributed controllers still
rely on the particular value assigned to V th. This voltage thresh-
old should not be set too high, to avoid triggering corrective
control at normal voltages, or at low but stable voltages. It
should not be set too low either, since it will lead to act later
and, hence, expose the system to degraded operating conditions
for a longer time. Also, when delayed, the corrective actions
have to be more pronounced [1], which results in sharper volt-
age corrections. Finally, Section 5.5 will give an example where
it is impractical to rely on V th without further information.
This leads to complementing the distributed controllers with
an upper level in charge of sending V th values - or equivalent
information - in real-time, when emergency conditions and im-
pending instability are detected.
The aim of an upper-level controller in a hierarchical con-
trol scheme is typically to coordinate the efforts of lower-level
controllers or to adjust their parameters adaptively. The latter
option is considered in this work. By adjusting V th in response
to the particular disturbance faced, the upper level provides the
whole scheme with the basic feature of an adaptive system.
To this purpose, the upper level is assumed to embed a
WAMS receiving real-time measurements [7]. In the future,
WAMS are expected to benefit from the progress made in syn-
chronized phasor measurement technology [6].
4.2. Implementation
Following a large disturbance, the role of the upper level is
to detect that the system is evolving towards long-term volt-
age instability, more precisely to identify that the system has
crossed a “critical voltage profile”. The latter defines the low-
est acceptable voltage V th at the various buses monitored by the
lower-level controllers. This way of doing is justified by the ob-
servation that a long-term voltage unstable system undergoes a
monotonic decrease of voltages, as illustrated by Fig. 1. Then,
the role of the distributed controllers will be to restore and
maintain their monitored transmission voltages at or slightly
above the critical voltage profile.
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This can be performed with very little information sent from
upper to lower level (virtually a single bit of information!). In-
deed, at the time the upper level detects that the system has
crossed the critical voltage profile, it sends a signal to the lower-
level controllers requesting each of them to take its currently
measured voltage V as threshold value V th. Each controller acts
independently from the others to restore V ≥ V th.
If, for any reason, the upper level monitoring scheme fails
providing the signal to the local controllers, the latter may use
their original (preset) thresholds. This redundancy increases the
reliability of the whole protection.
4.3. Detecting an impending instability
The simple example in Fig. 4 suggests taking for V th the
voltage VC at the critical point C. Indeed, at this point, the
load power is restored to the greatest possible extent. Before
crossing C, the transmission voltage V is depressed by the tap
changes but in exchange for a restoration of the distribution
voltage V2, while after crossing C both transmission and dis-
tribution voltages are depressed.
The method detailed in [23] can be used to identify the criti-
cal point in the general case involving multiple loads and multi-
ple generators, some of them getting limited. It is summarized
hereafter.
A set of algebraic equations:
ϕ(z, s) = 0 (6)
is fit to the sampled states, where z denotes the state vector and
s the vector of load active and reactive powers. These equations
are obtained under the following assumptions:
• the network is represented by its bus admittance matrix,
using real-time breaker status information;
• the short-term dynamics of generators, automatic voltage
regulators, speed governors, static var compensators, etc.
are replaced by accurate equilibrium equations;
• whether a generator is voltage controlled or limited by its
OEL is either known from measurements or detected from
computation of the field current.
Sensitivities identify when a combination of load active and
reactive powers passes through a maximum. This requires
knowing the consumed powers only: no model of load be-
haviour with voltage is needed. Sensitivities of the total reactive
power generation Qg to the load reactive powers are considered.












where q is the vector of load reactive powers, which is a sub-
vector of s.
At the maximum load power point, one real eigenvalue of
∂ϕ
∂z
changes sign. Hence, in theory, the sensitivities change sign
passing through infinity. In practice, the critical point crossing
is identified at a discrete time k such that, for at least bus j:
∂Qg
∂q j
(k − 1) > d and
∂Qg
∂q j
(k) < −d (8)
where d > 0 is a properly chosen threshold.
It is essential to reflect any change of generator voltage con-
trol in the equations (6). An estimate of Eq, the e.m.f. propor-
tional to field current, is used to identify whether a synchronous
generator operates under control of its Automatic Voltage Reg-
ulator (AVR) or has been already limited by its OEL. Under
AVR control, an equation such as:
kE sq −G(Vo − V) = 0 (9)
is used, while under OEL control, it is replaced by an equation
of the type:
Eq − Elimq = kE sq − Elimq = 0 (10)
where G is the open-loop static gain of the AVR, E sq is the e.m.f.
behind saturated synchronous reactances, k is the saturation fac-
tor, V is the terminal voltage, Vo is the AVR voltage set-point,
and Elimq corresponds to the field current forced by the OEL. Eq
and k are components of z together with bus voltages and other
variables.
The most important feature of the sensitivities is their ability
to anticipate the effect of an approaching OEL activation. To
this purpose, when Eq exceeds Elimq , the OEL equation (10) is




. More details can be found in [23]. The anticipation
capability is illustrated in the next section.
4.4. Real-time measurement requirements
The above sensitivities are intended to be computed on suc-
cessive “snapshots” of the evolving system state. For each snap-
shot, the complex voltages at the various buses should be esti-
mated (at least in the region of interest). This is typically the
role of a state estimator running in the control center. In the
authors’ simulations, the rate at which measurement samples
are processed is high compared to the capability of present day
static state estimators. Therefore, extensions towards tracking
state estimation have to be considered. In this respect, the emer-
gence of the time synchronized phasor measurement technol-
ogy opens new perspectives, as detailed in [24], for instance.
Further discussion of this important issue is beyond the scope
of this paper. Note, however, that sensitivity computation and
monitoring can be replaced by a simpler (more conservative)
detection of emergency voltage conditions. In the two-level
scheme proposed in this paper, what is eventually sought is an
emergency signal sent to the lower-level controllers.
5. Simulation results
5.1. Test system
The performance of the proposed controller is illustrated on








































































Figure 9: One-line diagram of the Nordic32 test system
diagram is shown in Fig. 9. This small but realistic test system
has been used in several references, for instance [22, 23].
The results were obtained from time simulations of the sys-
tem model under the phasor approximation, typical of power
system stability studies [25]. This model involves close to
700 differential and algebraic states (including the 148 real and
imaginary components of the 74 complex bus voltages) Each
generator is equipped with an OEL in charge of limiting its field
current after a delay that may depend on the thermal overload.
Each of the 22 loads is fed through a distribution transformer
equipped with LTC. The LTCs have various delays: on the av-
erage, 30 s on the first tap change, and 10 s between subse-
quent changes. There are around 250 discrete states in limiters,
switches, LTC discrete-time controllers, etc.
5.2. Disturbance
The disturbance of concern is a short-circuit at t = 1 s on line
4032-4044. This fault is cleared after 0.1 s (5 cycles at 50 Hz)
by opening the faulted line, which remains opened. As the ini-
tial operating state is insecure, the outage of that line makes the
system long-term voltage unstable.
5.3. Lower-level distributed controllers
To counteract voltage instability, the system has been pro-
vided with five load shedding controllers, distributed over the
130-kV network of the Central area, where the most pro-
nounced voltage drops are experienced. These controllers mon-
itor voltages at buses 1041, 1042, 1043, 1044, and 1045, respec-
tively, and shed load at the corresponding distribution buses 1,
2, 3, 4 and 5 (see Fig. 9). Each controller sheds load in steps
∆P of 10 MW (with a corresponding decrease of the reactive
power) and with a delay τ of 3 seconds.
In replacement of, or in complement to load shedding, the
combined DVR-TVP logic detailed in Fig. 8 has been consid-
ered for the LTCs controlling the same five buses. δ has been
set to 0.01 pu, which is also the value of ϵ (see Fig. 7).
5.4. Results with exponential load models
The results of this subsection have been obtained assuming










where V is the corresponding distribution bus voltage, Vo the
initial value of V , Po (resp. Qo) the initial load active (resp.
reactive) power. α = 1, β = 2 was chosen for all loads.
Uncontrolled system response
The long-term unstable evolution of the uncontrolled system
has been shown in Fig. 1. It is driven by the LTCs and by a
cascade of OEL activations taking place between t = 55 and
t = 147 s, on g12, g14, g7, g11, g6, g15 and g16, successively.
Instability detection at upper level
At the upper level, the sensitivities (7) are used as explained
in Section 4. The z vectors have been obtained from snapshots
of the bus voltage phasors provided by time simulation.
The evolution of the sensitivity
∂Qg
∂q j
relative to bus 1041 is
shown in Fig. 10. A single bus is considered for clarity, but it
is proved in [23] that the sensitivities change sign altogether (at
least at buses most impacted by instability).
The solid line correspond to the sensitivity evaluated “with-
out OEL anticipation”, i.e. accounting for the field current lim-
itation of a generator after its OEL has acted. The change in
sign takes place at t = 87 s. Assuming a one-second delay to as-
certain that the sensitivities settle to negative values, the emer-
gency signal is sent by the upper level at t = 88 s. The dashed
line shows the sensitivity computed “with OEL anticipation”,
i.e. accounting for the near-future limitation of a generator as
soon as the field current exceeds its limit. The change in sign
occurs at t = 72 s, i.e. 15 s earlier.
When receiving the emergency signal, each lower-level con-
troller takes the transmission voltage it currently measures as
threshold value V th. Since the sensitivities give an early warn-
ing, some of these voltages can still be high. Considering that
emergency control is intrusive for customers, V th has been up-
per limited to 0.95 pu. The resulting values are given in Table 1.
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Figure 12: Evolution of load powers (shedding actions are identified with ∗)
Table 3: Power curtailments (in MW) with inter-level communication failures
No failure Case A Case B
bus V th power V th power V th power
(pu) shed (pu) shed (pu) shed
1041 0.93 20 0.93 40 0.93 80
1042 0.95 0 0.95 0 0.95 0
1043 0.95 50 0.95 50 0.95 130
1044 0.92 30 0.92 100 0.90 0
1045 0.94 100 0.90 0 0.90 0
Total 200 190 210
The LTC operation is illustrated in Fig. 14, relative to trans-
former 1041-1. The figure shows the trajectory of the system
superimposed to the diagram of Fig. 7. The large transients
due to the initial short-circuit have been removed for clarity.
The pre-disturbance operating point is O, with the voltage at the
distribution bus 1 in its dead-band. At t ≃ 30 s, when the sys-
tem has almost settled to a short-term equilibrium (see Fig. 1),
but before the LTC starts acting, the operating point is A. The
unsuccessful operation of the LTC leads to point B. Then, the
situation is aggravated by the field current limitation of genera-
tors g14 and g7, leading to point C. This makes the LTC enter
the TVP region of operation. The reverse tap changes preserve
transmission to the detriment of distribution voltage, until the
LTC eventually settles at point D in the dead-band.
Comparison
When resorting to load shedding, some loads are discon-
nected while the others regain a normal voltage value. With
LTC control, the effort is shared by all loads, whose powers
decrease under the effect of depressed voltages. These two ac-
tions on loads can be compared considering, for load shedding,














































Figure 14: System trajectory in the (V1041,V1) space (voltages at the transmis-
sion and distribution ends of transformer 1041-1)
where Poi is the pre-disturbance active power of the load at the
i-th bus, P f inali is the corresponding value in the final steady
state, and I is the set of distribution buses whose voltage is
outside the LTC dead-band.
The values of ∆Pnr and the contribution of each bus are given
in Table 4 for the two stabilized evolutions shown in Fig. 13.
The values of ∆Pnr are comparable to the total curtailed powers
detailed in Table 2.
5.5. Results in the presence of induction motor loads
The performance of the proposed scheme has been tested in
more stringent conditions, assuming that the loads at buses 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 43, 46, and 47 include 40 % of induction motors. To
this purpose each of these eight loads has been split into a part
represented with the previous exponential model, taking 60 %
of the initial active power, in parallel with an equivalent (single
cage) induction motor, as shown in Fig. 15, relative to bus 1.
Each equivalent motor accounts for many motors connected to
the distribution system. It is represented by a set of three dif-
ferential and two algebraic equations, with parameters typical
of large industrial motors [10]. Shedding is applied to the non-
motor part of the loads.
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Table 4: Non-restored load power (MW)











Figure 15: Composite load model including an equivalent motor
Uncontrolled system response
The evolution of the voltage at bus 1041, under the effect
of the same disturbance, is shown with solid line in Fig. 16.
For comparison purposes, the figure shows with dotted line
the response which was obtained with fully exponential load
model, see Fig. 1. In the presence of motors, the voltage drop
is sharper. It takes place earlier, when the voltage support of
key generators is lost due to OEL action, which causes the mo-
tors to stall [1, 10]. The task of designing emergency control
is more delicate because: (i) a few seconds before collapsing,
voltages still have normal values, and (ii) the decrease is so fast
that prompt corrective actions are needed.
Instability detection at upper level
The evolution of the component of S Qg q relative to bus 1041
is shown in Fig. 17. Without (resp. with) OEL anticipation, the
change in sign takes place at t = 68 s (resp. t = 53s).
The values of V th taken by the controllers when receiving
the upper-level emergency signal are given in Table 5. With
OEL anticipation, the emergency was detected so early that all
voltages were still above the upper bound of 0.95 pu.
Stabilization by DVR-TVP control of LTCs
The effect of LTCs operating according to the combined
DVR-TVP logic is shown in Fig. 18. Even though the signal
is received very early, the LTCs control actions are too slow to
prevent the sharp voltage decay. They only succeed postponing
voltage collapse a little, at the cost of pronounced oscillations.
Stabilization by load shedding
Failure to stabilize the system also takes place when resorting
to distributed load shedding controllers with V th = 0.90 pu, as
previously considered (see Table 2). Indeed, with τ set to three
seconds, the controllers react too late to stabilize the system.
Reducing τ is not an option due to the risk of unduly shedding
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Figure 16: Unstable evolution of voltage at bus 1041 in the presence of induc-











 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70
t (s)
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Figure 17: Evolution of the sensitivity
∂Qg
∂q j
relative to bus 1041
Successful stabilization is obtained by combining load shed-
ding with the upper-level early detection of emergency. The
stabilized voltage evolution is shown in Fig. 19, for both sets of
V th values given in Table 5. The smoother evolution obtained
with the higher V th settings is noteworthy.
Figure 20 shows the performance of the same load shedding
scheme for 30, 40 and 50 % of motor load, respectively. Table
6 shows the corresponding power curtailments. The protection
scheme performs very similarly in all three cases, which reveals
some robustness with respect to load behaviour uncertainty.
Stabilization by both LTC control and load shedding
To deal with such severe situations, it is reasonable to com-
bine both types of corrective control. This is illustrated in
Fig. 21. The curve with solid line shows the voltage evolu-
tion that result from DVR-TVP control of LTCs, based on the
V th values in the third column of Table 5, together with load
shedding, based on the V th values in the second column of the
same table. Thus, LTC control is activated first, followed by
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Table 5: Voltage thresholds V th (in pu)
















 0  20  40  60  80  100  120
t (s)
(pu)
DVR-TVP control of LTCs - Vth determined without OEL anticipation
DVR-TVP control of LTCs - Vth determined with OEL anticipation
Uncontrolled system
Figure 18: Unsuccessful system stabilization by DVR-TVP control of LTCs
load shedding. The dashed curve, reproduced from Fig. 19,
corresponds to load shedding only. The reduction of distribu-
tion voltages by LTCs leads to shedding only 60 MW, instead
of 220 MW when LTCs are not used for emergency control. In
this combined scheme, two signals would be sent by the upper
level, intended to LTCs and load shedding, respectively.
6. Conclusion
A two-level adaptive control scheme against power system
voltage instability has been proposed.
At the lower level, it relies on a set of distributed controllers,
acting when (and as long as) monitored transmission voltages
are below threshold values. Upon detection of an emergency
situation, the upper level sends a signal to the distributed con-
trollers, for the latter to set their threshold values at the currently
measured voltages. The objective is to keep system voltages
above the critical profile corresponding to the emergency de-
tection. The distributed controllers adjust their actions to the
severity and location of the disturbance.
The emergency signal is obtained from wide-area monitoring
by the upper level. To this purpose, an advanced sensitivity-
based analysis has been considered.
The results obtained with the small but realistic Nordic32 test
system have confirmed the following expectations:
• proper adaptation of the voltage thresholds in real time
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t (s)
(pu) 30% of motor load
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Figure 20: Evolution of voltage at bus 1041 with load shedding, for three pro-
portions of motor load
• the proposed scheme is fault-tolerant since it accommo-
dates failures to receive the emergency signal;
• the early emergency signal sent by the upper level allows
acting fast enough in case of sharp voltage drops caused
by motor loads, a situation where relying on local voltages
is not sufficient.
Two types of emergency controls were considered. While
modified control of load tap changers can help in slowly de-
creasing voltage situations, it has to be replaced or, even better,
complemented by load shedding to counteract the faster insta-
bility caused by induction motor loads.
Automatic shunt compensation switching can be also in-
cluded, and should be given priority as it is less intrusive for
the consumers.
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Table 6: Power curtailments (MW)
proportion of motor load
bus 30 % 40 % 50 %
1041 30 30 20
1042 0 0 0
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